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To what extent, and in what ways, is it possible for works of fiction to influence their readers’ ethical de-
velopment? In this essay, I explore different answers to this descriptive question in philosophy and literary 
studies. I dub a view shared by Iris Murdoch and Martha Nussbaum as the attention account: that great 
works of fiction can influence their reader’s ethical development by compelling them to cultivate ethically 
charged attention. I then evaluate Joshua Landy’s criticism of this account and his alternative, which I dub the 
clarification account: that works of fiction can influence their reader’s ethical development by helping them 
clarify their core ethical commitments. I argue that neither the attention account nor the invitation account 
describes the one and only way in which works of fiction can influence their readers’ ethical development. 
I then ask a normative question: what ways in which works of fiction can influence our ethical development 
should we embrace? Drawing on Kendall Walton’s make-believe model of fictional experience, I develop an 
account of a third way in which works of fiction can influence their readers’ ethical development, which I call 
the invitation account: works of fiction can influence their readers’ ethical development by inviting them to 
unseat and positively revise their ethical commitments. I make the case for the invitation account by using 
it to analyze two contemporary novels, Rachel Cusk’s Outline and Marilynne Robinson’s Gilead. I argue that 
the process described by the invitation account—that is, the way of invitation—is one we should embrace.
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To what extent, and in what ways, is it possible for 
works of fiction to influence their readers’ ethical 
development? In this essay, I explore different 
answers to this question in philosophy and literary 
studies. I identify and evaluate three accounts of 
ways in which works of fiction can influence the 
ethical development of their readers, which I dub 
the attention account, the clarification account, and 
the invitation account. In (I), I outline the attention 
account, a view shared by Iris Murdoch and Martha 
Nussbaum. In (II), I explain Joshua Landy’s critique 
of the attention account and sketch out his opposing 
view, the clarification account. In (III), I evaluate 
Landy’s critique. I suggest that modest versions of 
the attention account and the clarification account are 
plausible and compatible, but that we—that is, human 
beings who are moral agents and readers of fiction—
should not rely on the modes of ethical development 
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they describe. In (IV), I develop an account of a 
third way in which works of fiction can influence 
their readers’ ethical development, which I call the 
invitation account. In (V), I turn to literary analysis of 
two widely acclaimed contemporary novels—Rachel 
Cusk’s Outline and Marilynne Robinson’s Gilead—as 
proof of concept. I show how these novels embed 
instructions for reading them that invite their readers 
to unseat and revise their ethical commitments, a 
process that my invitation account aptly describes. As 
these case studies show, I discuss in the conclusion, 
my account plausibly describes a way in which works 
of fiction can influence our ethical development that 
we should embrace.
I
Murdoch argues that reading literature draws the 
reader’s mind out of the self and into the real world. 
Since we human beings tend to be overwhelmingly 
selfish and self-deceptive, Murdoch claims, we must 
continually battle the vicious forces in our psyches 
by practicing a sort of ethically charged attention 
to reality. Reading great literature enacts this sort 
of attention, Murdoch argues, as it compels us to 
leave behind our egos and see the remarkable de-
tails of the world and other human beings with what 
she calls a ‘just and loving gaze.’ As Murdoch has 
it, great works of fiction can thus be marshalled in 
the battle against our vices, particularly obtuseness, 
and help us approach the light of ‘the Good.’1 In a 
similar vein, Nussbaum contends that great works 
of fiction themselves demonstrate the nuances of 
human life, capturing in words the minute, intimate, 
and delicate situational factors that moral agents 
must perceive and consider. For this reason, Nuss-
baum argues, reading great literature attunes us to 
attend to the complex moral dynamics of human 
life that the world’s detail reveals.2 Murdoch and 
Nussbaum share the basic view I now identify as 
the attention account: that great works of fiction 
can influence their readers’ ethical development by 
compelling them to take up, practice, and cultivate an 
attitude of ethically charged attention to the world’s 
particularities.
II
Landy takes aim at Nussbaum, in particular, and ar-
gues against the attention account on two counts. 
First, he disputes the claim that works of fiction, no 
matter how great, can compel readers to adopt this or 
that attitude, as it seems perfectly possible for some 
stone-cold readers to dive into pathos-laden literature 
and emerge unmoved. Second, he contends that, even 
if works of fiction were able to compel us to take up 
an attitude of attention while reading, we have no 
reason to think we would be bound to maintain this 
attitude after closing our books. On the contrary, Landy 
objects, surely people can read great literature and still 
be complacent elites—if not villains or boors—in their 
daily lives. Landy does not deny that reading fiction 
can fine-tune our ethical-attentional capacities; rather, 
he denies that this process can be involuntary. Instead, 
he holds that we can achieve such effects in reading 
works of fiction only insofar as we aim to achieve 
them. But normally, Landy posits, fiction influences 
our ethical development by a different route: When 
we read works of fiction, we react instinctively to the 
characters and their actions. Our ethical intuitions 
are exposed by these gut reactions, he contends, 
and hence we can more clearly see just what those 
intuitions are. Taken together, Landy’s clarification 
account holds that works of fiction can influence 
their reader’s ethical development by exposing their 
ethical intuitions and thereby helping them clarify 
their core ethical commitments.3
III
Landy’s critique only refutes an implausibly ambitious 
version of the attention account: that reading great 
fiction will always involuntarily influence one’s actual 
ethical attitude. But it is not clear that either Murdoch 
or Nussbaum endorses this ambitious, universal 
claim. To be charitable to them, and to the general 
type of view I identify as theirs, we should read the 
attention account as a more modest claim, one less 
ambitious and more restricted in scope: that reading 
great fiction can sometimes involuntarily influence 
one’s actual ethical attitude. Landy’s critique does 





not refute this more plausible version of the attention 
account. It could be the case that reading a great 
work of fiction would involuntarily influence the ac-
tual ethical attitude of one reader but not another, or 
would have such an effect on a given reader under 
some conditions and not others. Landy’s converse 
universal claim—that fiction can never involuntarily 
influence one’s actual ethical attitude—is as ambi-
tious as the view he ascribes to Nussbaum, and as 
implausible. If it were true, then fiction would never 
play a formative role in children’s unconscious ethical 
development, and no one would ever unexpectedly 
find their outlook on life altered after engaging with a 
fictional narrative. On the contrary, it seems plausible 
that fiction can surprise us or move us in ways that 
shape or challenge our ethical commitments, even 
without us intending such effects. Admittedly, this is 
an empirical claim made from the armchair (instead 
of the lab or the field). But it is enough to show 
that Landy’s far more ambitious armchair empirical 
claim—that fiction can never involuntarily influence 
one’s ethical attitude—is prima facie implausible.
Now, Landy does little to support the clarification 
account beyond presenting it as a plausible alterna-
tive to the attention account. But, we have no reason 
to assume at the outset that these two accounts 
exhaust our options. So, even if one is mistaken, 
the other is not necessarily correct. Moreover, the 
more modest version of the attention account is 
compatible with a relatively modest version of the 
clarification account: that the way of clarification, 
as it were (namely, the process of helping readers 
clarify their core ethical commitments by exposing 
their ethical intuitions) is not the only way in which 
works of fiction can influence their readers’ ethical 
development, but one way among multiple. This rel-
atively modest version of the clarification account is 
plausible, to my mind, as fictional experience does 
seem to expose our ethical intuitions—prompting 
us to praise or blame certain characters, rejoice or 
mourn at certain events, and so on—and thereby 
give us occasion for reflection. But that’s neither 
here nor there: what I want to do now is explore 
what questions persist even if the plausible, modest, 
compatible versions of the views I have identified 
are all correct. So, let’s suppose that works of fiction 
can influence their readers’ ethical development by 
clarifying their ethical commitments or by cultivating 
their ethical-attentional capacities, either voluntarily 
or involuntarily. Now what? Well, then we should see 
the attention account and clarification account not as 
master-theories, but as accounts of different possible 
ways in which works of fiction can influence their 
readers’ ethical development. The way of attention 
and the way of clarification—the processes described 
by the accounts described above—are ways we may 
either embrace or deplore, and ways which may not 
exhaust the field. As such, I want to turn to a new 
question: what ways in which works of fiction can 
influence their readers’ ethical development should 
we embrace?
For starters, should we embrace the way of attention 
(i.e., the process described by the attention account), 
or should we deplore it? Here, on this normative ques-
tion, is where Landy’s critique finds greater purchase. 
His opposition to Nussbaum’s view seems motivated 
by a well-placed concern about a not-so-hypotheti-
cal culture of reading that enthusiastically endorses 
the attention account: a concern that we should not 
predominantly rely on novels, of all things, to form 
our ethical commitments and take care of our ethical 
development.4 Indeed, where do we fit, as deliberative 
agents, into such a picture of moral psychology? If 
we look to fiction (even the great literature Murdoch 
and Nussbaum admire), in the main, to tell us what 
is right and good, then we risk eschewing authentic, 
careful deliberation about our values. If we look to 
fiction for a low-effort means of ethical development, 
then we risk eschewing moral responsibility for our 
character traits. If novels take the place of moral de-
liberation and deliberate effort, then human beings will 
become mere moral wantons, as Landy provocatively 
puts it, people “easily swayed by one-well meaning 
but unnuanced value judgement to the next,” rather 
than functioning moral agents.5
Of course, this concern is not a reason to think the 
attention account is false. Rather, it is a reason to 






I propose that works of fiction can furnish their 
readers with instructions, so to speak, for how to 
appropriately engage with them: instructions that 
clue in readers to what ethical commitments they 
should imagine themselves having while living in 
a given work of fiction’s make-believe world. By 
impressing alternative outlooks onto their minds, 
works of fiction can invite their readers to carry 
these ethical commitments into their actual lives. 
I borrow the expression “make-believe” from Kend-
all Walton, who construes experiencing fiction as 
entertaining two different games of make-believe: 
the game of the fictional world itself and a game 
in which we, the reader, participate in that world. 
Playing both games at once, in Walton’s model, we 
can keep one foot out of the fictional world and one 
foot in, going about our lives while playing pretend 
that the fictional world is real and that we play a role 
in it.6 Now, Walton’s make-believe model of fiction-
al experience is ultimately a metaphor which I find 
helpful in describing a familiar fact: that we respond 
emotionally and evaluatively to fictional events and 
characters as if they were real. With that in mind, I use 
“make-believe” merely to refer to a reader’s state of 
mind when they respond to fiction as if it were real. (If 
you balk at talk of make-believe, simply swap in your 
preferred metaphor.) Such a state of mind, I suggest, 
is one in which we can imagine certain things to be 
true, right, good, or beautiful that we judge differently 
in actual fact. Walton does not go this far, claiming 
we are peculiarly inflexible in adjusting our values 
even within make-believe games.7 But this claim is 
unsubstantiated, and experience speaks against it: 
movie-goers make-believedly endorse the attitudes 
and actions of renegade heroes like superheroes or 
rebellious youth, it seems, even when they would de-
cry them in actual fact. Such cases evince that, while 
playing make-believe with literature, we can imagine 
ourselves having some ethical commitments different 
from our own while not going so far as to adopt them 
outside of the make-believe realm of fiction.
What I want to suggest is that, if we hold our make-be-
lieve commitments in steady tension, we can try on 
the worldview expressed by a fictional narrative—that 
is, the narrator’s implicit set of beliefs, dispositions, 
preoccupations, values, and attitudes—but can take 
it or leave it when we stop playing make-believe. To 
elaborate on my earlier claim, successful works of 
fiction provide the reader with instructions for what 
worldview to take up, indicators of the worldview the 
narrative expresses. The instructions I have in mind 
can be anything from references to other texts that 
inform the narrator’s outlook to digressive vignettes 
or recollections that signal or rehearse the ethical 
commitments that a given work of fiction expects of 
its reader. By incorporating clues like these, a work 
of fiction can point to what ethical commitments we 
should make-believedly adopt in order to emotionally 
appreciate it as a coherent narrative. If we follow the 
work of fiction’s instructions, taking up its ethical 
commitments and thereby appreciating its narrative 
design, we can end up with reason to unseat our 
avoid embracing the process it describes (i.e., the 
way of attention) to the exclusion of further, active 
modes of value formation and character develop-
ment. Now, if we should beware moral wantonness 
and thus deplore the way of attention, at least if 
writ large, should we instead embrace the way of 
clarification? It is not so clear we should. Beware 
moral wantonness, yes, but beware moral stasis too. 
If we look to fiction merely to help us figure ourselves 
out, we lose what remains attractive in Murdoch’s 
transformative ideal, in spite of the way of attention’s 
practical pitfalls: that great literature can change us, 
unexpectedly, by drawing us away from the ego and 
toward things beyond ourselves that are authentic, 
beautiful, and good. What we need to do, I suggest, 
is identify another way in which fiction can influence 
our ethical development, one which incorporates 
the attractive features of both the way of attention 
and the way of clarification. An account of this third 
way will not amount to an exclusive master-theory 
of fiction’s role in our ethical lives. Rather, it will be 
an account of one among various ways in which 
fiction can influence our ethical development, but 
one we should embrace rather than fear or deplore.






Why should we find my invitation account plausible? 
Because, simply put, it helps us understand litera-
ture. Why should we embrace the way of invitation, 
so to speak, that it articulates? Because this is a 
way in which literature can influence our ethical 
development while avoiding the pitfalls of moral 
wantonness and moral stasis. This much will become 
clear, I expect, by applying the invitation account to 
examples of literary fiction. My case studies are two 
widely acclaimed contemporary novels, Rachel Cusk’s 
Outline and Marilynne Robinson’s Gilead, which serve 
as compelling but contrasting proofs-of-concept for 
the invitation account. In what follows, I show how 
each novel provides the reader with instructions for 
ethical perspective-taking in the way I have described. 
Outline tracks a series of ten conversations the enig-
matic narrator Faye has with people she encounters 
on a trip to teach a creative writing course in Athens. 
As Faye questions them, the characters retrace and 
reinterpret fallouts in their lives and relationships. 
Gilead consists of letters Reverend John Ames writes 
as he approaches the end of his life, letters he intends 
his young son to read when he comes of age. As the 
novel progresses, Ames’s letters become increasingly 
preoccupied with the return home of his wayward 
godson, John Ames “Jack” Boughton, and Ames’s 
quandaries in responding to him. Why these novels 
are compelling, I suggest, largely comes down to 
how they invite us to revise our ethical commitments.
Outline, I contend, invites the reader to adopt an 
outlook of engaged skepticism—skepticism in the 
sense of a doubting, but not necessarily hostile atti-
tude towards the actions and claims of others. First, 
the novel employs vignettes to instruct the reader to 
second-guess the tidy life-narratives of others. Right 
from the get-go, Faye judges a billionaire’s erratic, 
distracted behaviour as rendering him “a child with 
too many Christmas presents” rather than “the re-
laxed, well-heeled man” he presents in his life-story. 
Faye finds it “difficult to assimilate everything [she] 
is being told” and thus swiftly casts the billionaire out 
of her—and the reader’s—attention.8 Further vignettes 
and recollections strengthen this effect. In talking to 
fellow teacher Ryan, for instance, Faye briefly recol-
lects a time she saw a woman appraise attractive 
girls with her husband but betray her unease with a 
private “grimace of utter desperation.”9 This memo-
ry undercuts Ryan’s defense of his own wandering 
eye, thereby encouraging the reader to test Faye’s 
interlocutors’ claims against their own experiences. 
A final vignette echoes the first: playwright Anne re-
lates her revealing conversation with a stranger on 
a plane, in which (in contrast to Faye’s own rambling 
dialogue with her unnamed seat partner on her flight 
to Athens) the stranger went silent and obstinately 
“seated himself in his own view of life,”10 revealing 
another spurious life outline.
Outline’s descriptive details instruct the reader to 
bolster their skeptical outlook by adopting an atti-
tude of estrangement from others. Faye describes 
her neighbour on the plane as a portrait, as if his 
formal English “had been applied to him carefully 
with a brush, like paint.”11 Ryan she describes as be-
own worldview: reason to question aspects of our 
worldview in light of the alternative commitments 
the narrative expresses, and perhaps even reason 
to adopt some of the latter. If the work of fiction’s 
worldview has ethical commitments which improve 
upon our own, then it can influence our ethical de-
velopment by inviting us to adopt improved ethical 
commitments, first make-believedly through its in-
structions, then—if we so choose—further into our 
actual lives. Taken together, the story I have de-
veloped here is what I label the invitation account: 
works of fiction can influence their reader’s ethical 
development by inviting them to unseat and (posi-
tively) revise their ethical commitments in light of 
alternatives they entertain while make-believedly 
engaging with a fictional world. Works of fiction 
present readers with such invitations by offering 
them instructions for entertaining certain ethical 
commitments. These instructions are embedded in 
the text in the form of descriptive details, allusions, 
vignettes, recollections, and the like that articulate 
the worldview the narrative expresses.





ing “put together out of unrelated elements, so that 
the different parts of him didn’t entirely go togeth-
er.”12 Indeed, Ryan himself affirms the “feeling of 
estrangement from his own body” he had felt in his 
home country of Ireland,13 confirming the enduring 
accuracy of Faye’s imagery. The plane neighbour 
turns out shorter and wider than Faye had supposed, 
and she finds it “difficult… to integrate these dimen-
sions with his character,”14 signalling that the reader 
should not pin down people in their mind too quickly 
or easily. The plane neighbour later transforms into 
a “prehistoric creature” in Faye’s mind, “his claw-like 
hands with their white fur fumb[ling] at [her] shoul-
ders”15 as he deludes himself into making an advance 
on her, thereby becoming “something about which 
[Faye] could feel only absolute ambivalence.”16 All 
told, Outline positions Faye’s interlocutors as alien 
specimens ripe for the reader’s scrutiny, objects of 
study compromised by artifice and deception. In 
doing so, the novel indicts human beings who refuse 
to acknowledge the fallibility, fragility, and internal 
disorder of their lives and personalities. It thereby 
instructs the reader to adopt, and invites them to 
maintain, a provocative ethical commitment: that 
we should survey the human world with resolutely 
dispassionate skepticism.
In contrast to Faye’s ambivalence, Gilead’s John 
Ames lovingly pores over the world’s particularities. 
He beckons the reader out of their ego and into an 
outlook of grace, one of human goodwill reflecting 
divine goodwill. Gilead’s instructions come largely 
by way of intertextuality, as Ames references the 
books that have shaped his worldview, particularly 
Scripture and the works of Feuerbach. Early on, he 
compares his and his father’s journey through the 
countryside to “Abraham and Isaac on the way to 
Mount Moriah,”17 clueing us into Gilead’s parallels with 
Biblical narratives, particularly those stories (often of 
fathers and sons) that resist tidy interpretation. By 
introducing Feuerbach, Ames underwrites his own 
attitude of joyful appreciation of life, as Feuerbach 
“is about as good on the joyful aspects of religion as 
anybody, and he loves the world.”18 Ames’s “mention 
of Feuerbach and joy” prompts him to assert that 
“[t]his is an interesting planet [that] deserves all the 
attention you can give it,”19 a remark through which 
the novel instructs us to give its world due attention. 
Indeed, in a later sermon Ames wants to “talk about 
the gift of physical particularity”20 by discussing two 
Scriptural passages that highlight God’s grace even 
as human beings struggle with him: the stories of the 
Sacrament in Mark 14:22 and of Jacob wrestling with 
the angel in Genesis 32:23-32. The similarly bleak story 
of Hagar and Ishmael, Ames suggests, “seems like 
a specific moment of divine Providence.”21 Through 
allusions like these, Gilead signals to the reader that, 
to appreciatively inhabit Ames’s perspective, they 
should make-believedly adopt a worldview in which the 
ethical life involves continually striving to be worthy 
of the grace human beings have been given in the 
gift of life itself.
Like Outline, Gilead is dense with vignettes and recol-
lections that clue in the reader to the key conflicts of 
its narrative. Within the first few pages, Ames recalls 
how he once burnt up a letter from his father, an act 
he sees as an example of how “too much anger, too 
often or at the wrong time, can destroy more than 
you would ever imagine.” Ames warns his son—and 
us—about his failure to “control [his] temper.”22 He 
swiftly starts into a story of his and his father’s search 
for the grave of his estranged paternal grandfather, 
which signals that the ultimate tragedy of this nar-
rative would be for a father figure and a son figure 
to “never [have] any reconciliation between them in 
this life.”23 The moral danger of anger and violence is 
affirmed by another memory, that of a sermon Ames 
scrapped during the Spanish influenza in which he had 
planned to warn against “the Lord’s judgement when 
we decide to hammer our plowshares into swords.”24 
Another old story, that of an abolitionist town whose 
tunnel collapsed, highlights another key ethical com-
mitment of Ames’s worldview: that we should cultivate 
a conciliatory appreciation of human folly, as “[e]ven 
thoughtful people have lapses of judgement from time 
to time.”25 If the reader takes the novel’s cue here, they 
will find themselves well-positioned to appreciate 
Jack’s folly. And, living in Ames’s frame of mind, as 
Gilead’s vignettes and recollections instruct, they will 





be disposed to rejoice when Ames overcomes his 
abiding anger towards Jack, offers him his blessing, 
and finally “love[s] him as much as [Jack’s father] 
meant [him] to.”26 Gilead invites the reader to eschew 
anger and embrace compassion in their actual life, 
as hard as doing so may be.
Conclusion
My readings of these novels identify what holds each 
one together as a coherent narrative: that it instructs 
the reader to take up its narrator’s worldview. The 
reader must join Faye in studying her interlocutors 
with engaged suspicion in order to see a common 
thread among the ten disconnected conversations 
that comprise Outline’s plot. Likewise, the reader 
must see extending grace to Jack as Ames’s moral 
duty in order to register him finally blessing Jack 
as a moral triumph and Gilead’s denouement. The 
power of these novels rests on their vignettes, rec-
ollections, descriptive details, and intertextual al-
lusions, which figure as instructions to entertain a 
distinctive outlook while playing make-believe in the 
novel’s world: an outlook of skepticism in one case 
and grace in the other. In this way, Cusk’s Outline and 
Robinson’s Gilead provide the reader with standing 
invitations to adopt a novel outlook on their everyday 
experience as well.
As this discussion shows, my invitation account 
helps us understand literature: it identifies what fea-
tures may explain the aesthetic success of some 
works of fiction. This gives us good reason to find 
my account plausible. Moreover, the process I have 
sketched (i.e., the way of invitation) is more attractive 
than those glossed by the attention account and the 
clarification account. It captures Landy’s concern 
that we should take the reins of fiction’s influence 
on our ethical development: we are not condemned 
to be moral wantons, even if we opt to read great 
literature, for we can decline a work of fiction’s invi-
tation to revise our ethical commitments. Yet it also 
captures Murdoch and Nussbaum’s hope that fiction 
can move us in unexpectedly transformative ways: 
we need not wind up in moral stasis, for we can find 
ourselves experimenting with untested worldviews 
in fiction’s lab of make-believe. For these reasons, 
the way of invitation is one we should confidently 
embrace. Novels like Outline and Gilead influence 
the ethical development of their readers by inviting 
them to unseat and revise their ethical commitments 
in light of radical alternatives that the narrative has 
instructed them to entertain. In this way, fiction has 
the power to unmoor us from our default attitudes 
and send us out into a sea of uncharted worldviews. 
This may not be the only way in which fiction can 
influence our ethical development, but it is an entic-
ing one. Why? Because it offers us opportunities for 
personal change which, to use a Platonist metaphor 
Murdoch would have liked, may prove to be ladders 
out of ignorance’s cave.
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